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 Is there really a ‘global human rights deficit’?  
Consequentialist liability and cosmopolitan 
alternatives 
 
1. Introduction 
The existing global economic order clearly has grotesque effects in the form of life-threatening 
poverty and unequal life prospects. Does this mean, however, that any identifiable agent is acting 
unjustly towards any other within this order? There are two ways that one could take that question. 
Either principles of distributive justice that should apply to the global order, as they do in any 
domestic order, are being breached, or more basic rights are being violated. 
 
Cosmopolitan theorists have criticised views treating the global order differently to the domestic 
from the point of view of justice.1 Yet, faced with an institutional set up which is not easily 
amenable to a continuous and robust redistribution, many have held-off characterising international 
relations in terms of full principles of distributive justice, such as the difference principle, equality 
of opportunity or of resources.2 In fact, an important critique of this line of cosmopolitan thought is 
that principles of social distributive justice are designed for a special type of agent, with authority to 
distribute rights and duties across all those capable of affecting distributive outcomes, continually 
and fairly adjusting patterns of social benefit and burden distribution. For an agent capable of 
'background adjustment' to act justly, it must ever adjust for the myriad of individual, collective, 
associational, economic and non-economic interactions, chains of causes and networks of causes 
affecting the distribution of social goods and social costs. Agentless robust principles of distributive 
fairness are incomplete in the way a sentence without a grammatical subject is incomplete.3 We 
may have descriptions of unsatisfactory states of affairs, and perhaps a sense of imperfect duties to 
address these, but not statements of strict obligations of justice.4 With no relevant agent, then there 
are no strict obligations, no strict accountability and so no real principles of social justice. This, the 
‘Agency Objection’, is distinct from simplistic objections based on the absence of a world state, or 
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a coercive order.5 The agency objection challenges: show us the clear, action-guiding, social justice-
satisfying principles complete with a specified agent on whom they reasonably impose perfect 
duties. If there is a claimed failure in social justice, then we need those principles in order to assess 
the failing actions of some agent, not merely the description of an unsatisfactory state of affairs. I 
am not aware of an author that has supplied this account of agency and social justice-producing 
perfect duties for the global sphere. 
 
An alternative, apparently surer, route characterises the negative effects of the global order as basic 
human rights violations. If we can connect the actions of specific agents with life-threatening 
poverty, then those agents must be liable for serious harms. This line of responsibility and 
accountability engages with strict obligations in practical reason (what we should do). The global 
order could be otherwise than it is, avoiding grievous effects. Trade principles and agreements, for 
example, permitting the subsidy of rich farmers in affluent countries to the detriment of poor 
farmers elsewhere, and the institutions of state sovereignty with their resource privileges and 
borrowing privileges that lead to corruption and resource curses, conspire to produce poverty and 
could all be otherwise.6 This view accuses the global order of violating minimal human rights 
standards, and any participant upholding this order by voting for or paying taxes to states that 
contribute to it, of complicity. Participants in affluent countries are morally accountable for the lack 
of fulfilment of human rights that is massive poverty: the global ‘human rights deficit’. As liable 
they must supply remedies for their complicity. 
 
The agency objection, however, is not only a strong argument against the first analysis of 
international obligations above, but also against this second minimal alternative: poverty as 
wholesale breach of human rights, and participation as moral complicity with this ‘human rights 
deficit.’ In part I I identify the key features of this view that I shall call ‘Minimal 
Cosmopolitanism’, because it appeals to human rights as minimal conditions of justice. My 
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challenge, in II, identifies a key condition for human rights breaches that is satisfied in the 
motivating analogies used by Minimal Cosmopolitans but not in our relationship to the causes of 
global poverty. A human rights breach requires a recognisable action (or omission), direct or 
negligent, personal or collective, that constitutes an identifiable wrong towards a person. To be 
liable for a wrong of this kind one must either be the agent (individual or collective) performing the 
wronging action, or one must collaborate with the wronging action of another agent. For an action 
to wrong another it must itself unreasonably impose losses or increased risks on another person. 
This criterion distinguishes genuine complicity with a directed wronging from merely engaging 
with a network of causes that has negative consequences, such as participating in the road traffic 
system, with its yearly fatality statistics. In III, I consider four candidates from the global economic 
system for the relevant wronging actions and agents with which we might be complicit: individual 
economic decisions by agents in the economic system (taken singly or collectively), state 
agreements in trade fora like the WTO, and finally specific background rules defining the 
international rights and privileges of states in trade and borrowing. I show how each case fails to 
supply more than a metaphorical sense in which there is an appropriate wronging action with which 
we can be personally morally complicit. In conclusion, I outline an alternative version of 
cosmopolitanism that I call ‘International Cosmopolitanism’, that takes seriously the type of 
political agency present in the international sphere, but is neither complacent nor conservative with 
regard to moral standards for international relations. 
 
I 
2. The Minimal Cosmopolitan claim 
‘Minimal Cosmopolitanism’ is the version of cosmopolitan theory that holds agents accountable for 
fundamental human rights breaches and defines a breach in terms of serious negative outcomes for 
human well-being, such as the negative effects of an economic system. This contrasts with, but is 
not excluded by, other forms of cosmopolitanism, such as the kind that would judge the global 
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order in terms of full principles of egalitarian distributive justice. Both are different from 
‘International Cosmopolitanism’. This holds that each state has obligations towards its demos 
(citizen bodies) to act on robust egalitarian principles of distributive justice, and all states as 
political communities, have duties to act fairly in dealing with other political communities by 
proposing mutually acceptable principles for trade, standards for inter-state law, and aid. I shall say 
more about this version of cosmopolitanism, as a viable alternative, at the end. 
 
Minimal Cosmopolitanism holds the following to be sufficient conditions for complicity in the 
violation of human rights, for which those complicit are responsible and accountable: 
i. Cause: Someone’s wellbeing suffers a serious negative outcome caused by a given 
institutional order 
ii. Foreseeably: the agent foresees that an institutional order with which they cooperate will 
have these serious negative effects 
iii. Avoidably: a) it is possible/conceivable for the order to be otherwise than it is, in terms of 
effects, and b) it is possible for the agent to be non-cooperative with that order7 
iv. Deriving benefit: the agent derives some benefit from this order 
 
On this view, an institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably produces conditions that harm a 
person’s key interests thereby violates that person’s human rights; knowingly contributing to that 
order makes one culpable for those violations.8 Severe poverty, for example, undermines life and 
health. If you indeed contribute to a global order that has these effects, then by these conditions you 
are culpable. I will ignore the ‘deriving benefit’ condition as imposing a scheme on others who 
suffer from it is independently wrong.9 One’s complicity in murder is wrong even if one does not 
benefit from it, and it is not sufficient to be complicit with murder that one benefits from it. One 
must first, then, establish the primary wrong of complicity. 
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Some theorists take violation to be inadequate as a description of the relevant breach, and prefer to 
talk of under-fulfilment.10 But given we are looking to establish moral accountability I will use 
either ‘breach’ or ‘violation’. The above, then, are proposed sufficient conditions for when your 
actions make you culpable, with the practical upshot that you must stop contributing and/or supply 
a remedy. 
II 
3. The argument 
These conditions, however, are neither sufficient for violating a human right nor for complicity with 
a violation/breach. They are insufficient in a very important and telling way. Because of this failure 
in its account of responsibility Minimal Cosmopolitanism is unhelpful as an action-guiding account 
of international justice. 
 
The missing condition is that the negative outcome should be the result of an identifiable wronging 
action. A distinctive contribution of human rights (and other rights) standards to our moral 
repertoire is as principles that hold agents responsible for actions that are identifiable as wrongs 
towards others. This, if anything, sets aside human rights standards as independently valuable 
standards from, say, standards of social distributive justice. They identify actions that do not imply 
distributive unfairness in a social scheme, but are serious wrongs towards people irrespective of 
their place in such a scheme. In addition to any serious losses suffered there must be a relationship 
of wronging, which means we need to be able to identify an action that is the wronging action 
(direct or negligent), causing these losses. This notion of a directed wrong goes hand in hand with 
the Minimal Cosmopolitan aim of finding clear lines of responsibility for wrongs against the global 
poor. 
 
The additional condition I am proposing, then, is that human rights violations imply more than 
negative outcomes or states of affairs resulting from a network of causes. We need to identify 
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wronging actions: 
A: For a person to suffer a human rights violation there must be an action, 
identifiable as such, that wrongs that person 
Actions that wrong can be individual or collective. The wrong of murder is an act of wrongful 
killing. I can contribute to the individual act by assisting or facilitating the murderer, by handing 
them the murder weapon in a timely way, say. The act will foreseeably harm, it is avoidable in that 
the murderer could have chosen to do otherwise, and I am culpable if I knowingly assist this act or 
my negligence permits it. Collectively torturing an individual, even where any one individual’s 
actions would not successfully torture, can be said to be a wrong because there is an action: torture, 
towards which members of the collective contribute. An individual’s contribution to that action by 
taking part in, or facilitating, it is a wrongful contribution. So the test is: 
W: To wrong a person an agent must either engage in an action that wrongs that 
person or act with the aim of contributing to/assisting/facilitating an action that 
wrongs a person 
This condition is necessary because we are seeking lines of responsibility and accountability and 
one cannot be responsible and accountable without doing something or knowingly contributing to 
the doing of something that wrongs another. In order to contribute to a murder there must be an 
independently identifiable action that is a murder, and you must either participate in or contribute 
towards that action. Complicity here is where one acts with the aim of assisting the wrong of 
another, contributing to a collective wrong, or allowing a wrong where one could thwart it, and 
doing so for no legitimate reason. However, unlike the straightforward wronging test, complicity 
requires an aim to contribute, even if by omission.11 You do no wrong by selling kitchen knives 
even if you know a percentage of them each year will be used to harm others: 
CW: An agent is complicit with wronging another, and thereby also commits a 
wrong, where she acts with the aim of contributing towards a wronging action 
(including where she allows a wronging action she could thwart, for no legitimate 
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reason) 
This of course raises the question of what is a wronging action. For Minimal Cosmopolitanism it is 
sufficient for a wronging act that it satisfies conditions i-iv above. However, there are three types of 
standard case in which these conditions are satisfied and yet there is no wrong. This is because the 
agent cannot be said to be illegitimately imposing a loss on others. 
 
a) Intervening agency. For example, a writer who knows that publishing a news article supporting 
women’s rights will lead to riots by religious fanatics in which people will be hurt. The wrong 
involved, if any, is by those engaged in the riot, not the writer of the piece. It is they that transform 
her actions into the causes of a wrong, which they perpetrate. The writer is not complicit in the 
wronging actions in the riot, even if she is involved in the conditions that foreseeably gave rise to 
them. b) Accumulating causes. The negative consequences are the effects of actions that are not in 
themselves unfair impositions of loss. Viz. the accumulation of negative effects on life prospects 
due to some parents giving support and advice to their children in their studies. Here responsibility 
for outcomes appropriately falls on an agent with the special capacity to continuously adjust for 
those effects, aiming to distribute their costs in a fair way (through the judicious allocation of social 
rights and duties).12 There is no action-guiding principle individuals could follow which would 
guarantee a reasonable or fair balance here between personal aims and the common good. Where a 
regulative authority is present, it can distribute costs and benefits in a fair way, but there is no 
agent-centred principle for individuals to achieve this. c) Causing a loss, but for a legitimate reason. 
Consider rightful punishment; harm resulting form self-defence; and health effects resulting from 
rejecting someone for a job because she is not the best candidate. Each represents a serious loss 
where the action causing the loss is legitimate.13 
 
What sets wronging actions apart, then, is not solely that they have foreseeable and avoidable 
negative effects, even serious ones. There must be a sense in which the action is illegitimate, by 
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illegitimately causing a loss. There must be a corresponding action-guiding principle that in being 
followed establishes a reasonable trade-off between agent aims and the losses or risks caused to 
others by one’s actions. Illegitimate actions deviate from such reasonable principles. Murder is not 
a reasonable imposition of loss, but justified self-defence that harms an attacker is reasonable. A 
state’s distribution of social goods and burdens, including education, health, opportunity and 
income, can satisfy a general principle of fairness, such as allowing uncompensated inequalities 
only if they benefit the least advantage. There is, however, no such principle that can coherently and 
strictly guide an individual in her choice to assist her children with their studies. That would require 
a notion of how she can, in her actions and choices, continuously achieve a fair balance between 
personal aims against all foreseeable economic costs to others. There is no such reasonable 
principle for individuals. 
 
A wronging action, then, is one that unreasonably imposes harms or losses on a person, whether this 
is by direct act or omission, individually or collectively. Call an action that unreasonably imposes 
losses on someone a ‘directed wronging’. The presence of a directed wronging is a necessary 
condition for a human rights violation. 
DW: An action causing a loss/risk to a person wrongs that person when it 
unreasonably imposes those losses/risks on her (violates a principle for 
fairly/reasonably balancing gains and burdens, e.g., individual aims and social goals, 
for no legitimate reason) 
Directed wrongs can also take the form of omissions. Failing to alert your neighbour of an 
imminent and dangerous break-in where it implies no minimal burden for you is an illegitimate 
omission. Spending all your time on neighbourhood watch, however, has serious costs and cannot, 
in normal circumstances, be a non-voluntary obligation. Except where there is a special fair burden-
sharing scheme, refusing to be a permanent neighbourhood watcher is not an illegitimate omission. 
That is, the principle that I should help someone when I find myself in a position to do so and with 
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no legitimate reason to decline is a reasonable principle. The principle, on the other hand, that I 
must personally try to prevent all people threatened by negative conditions, such as break-ins to 
their homes, is not reasonable. Of course, one could say that we have an obligation to contribute a 
fair amount towards that end. But that only makes sense where there is a body with the power to 
fairly allocate these benefits and burdens. Without that, there is no clear, perfect duty-imposing 
principle for any agent to personally follow that will secure a fair balance between individual aims 
and the common good. 
 
Consider the road traffic system. You contribute to that, through your taxes and your actions, and it 
has negative consequences reflected in road death statistics (including non-motorists). Some of us 
benefit from this system. However, aside from specific cases where motorists act with malice, or 
recklessly, thereby imposing unreasonable risks on others, there is no directed wronging towards 
others of the kind necessary for any contributor to the system to be culpable and accountable. 
Negative consequences of the system still matter, it is just that a different kind of responsibility is 
appropriate than the kind in directed wronging cases. If an authority exists that can alter the rules, 
adjusting levels of risk and gain in a fair way, then that authority has responsibility for the 
distribution of risks and benefits in the system. Individual participants have duties to support the 
proper functioning of that authority, and where possible to prevent it acting unfairly. Nevertheless, 
the mere existence of negative systemic consequences is insufficient for us to speak of directed 
wrongs. There is no principle individuals could follow with regard to all other persons that reflects a 
fair distribution of risk levels to others and burdens to oneself. Similarly, consider producers of a 
given good put out of business because we change our preferences and patterns of consumption. 
That can have foreseeable negative consequences in the form of poverty for producers, and an 
authority with powers to distribute rights and duties in this regard has a duty of care to address these 
consequences by fairly distributing rights and duties. An individual’s reduced purchasing of that 
good for consumption, however, is not a directed wrong. There is no action-guiding principle she 
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could individually follow in market decisions that reasonably and fairly balances satisfaction of her 
market aims and the reduction of market risks to others. With no such principle from which to 
deviate in her actions, there is no sense in which she wrongs others in her market choices. 
 
It is worth noting that this test for wronging covers wronging by negligence. That is where one’s act 
(or omission) violates a general duty not to unreasonably impose risks on others, irrespective of 
whether there is a direct aim to do so. Driving recklessly may not mean to harm, but violates a duty 
of care towards others by unreasonably raising the risks they face.  
 
Does our relationship to the causes of global poverty satisfy the above agency tests? The actions of 
those accused of complicity (those living in affluent societies) do not obviously connect with a 
wronging action violating the rights of the poor just because we participate in a causal network of 
international interactions that has these negative consequences. Claiming the economic order ‘itself’ 
violates or infringes the human rights of the poor is a misleading metaphor unless we can cash this 
out in specific wronging actions with which we might be complicit. 
 
III 
4. Human rights and global poverty 
Here we are looking for two things. Firstly, actions that wrong the poor, equivalent to say actions of 
slavers in a slave system and also any institutions empowering their acts of slavery. Secondly, it 
needs to be shown that participants in the global economic system are complicit with those actions 
in the way we would be complicit with slavery by upholding slaver-empowering institutions. 
 
Yet poverty and its causes do not have this structure. The poverty-inducing effects of the global 
economic order are due to accumulated actions, in themselves not unreasonable or describable as 
‘imposing poverty’, individually or collectively, in the way that blockading a particular community 
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can impose poverty. Beyond the metaphor of the global economic order acting (‘the global order 
violates the human rights of the poor’) 14 we have a series of micro-economic decisions, institutions 
that have come about through treaties and collaboration between international agents, states and 
associations, and patterns of economic behaviour, such as supply and demand, price fluctuations, 
currency regimes, and exchange rates. Of course, there are clearly wrongful market actions: bribery, 
theft, selling dangerous goods, fraud and so forth. But the accusation is not that we are directly 
complicit with those types of acts, resulting in global poverty. Rather, it is that the explicit rules of 
the economic order in some way wrong the global poor, and we are complicit with that. 
 
From the global network of economic choices and agreements we call the global economic order, I 
will consider three plausible candidates for actions wronging the global poor: 
(A) All our actions and decisions in the global economic order taken together, 
(B) International trade agreements/fora (and the actions of states that participate in them), and 
(C) State’s conformity to background rules of international law setting out governments’ rights 
and privileges. 
Taking each in turn, I will show why it does not fit the bill for deriving lines of responsibility 
linking us to human rights breaches against the global poor. 
  
(A) When the poor in a society suffer there are a number of effects in play. There is the price of the 
goods the poor cannot access, and the sellers, wholesalers and retailers, selling at prices they cannot 
reach. There are the supply and demand trends of international markets affecting producers and 
consumers. There are the decisions of governments to subsidise sectors of their own economies 
(farmers, technology, unemployed labour through benefits) that disadvantage those in the poor 
economy through their effects on prices. There are international agreements on trade rules between 
sates, often biased in favour of some countries’ over others. There are also background international 
rules setting out the rights of states and their governments, giving de facto rulers control over 
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domestic natural resources and national borrowing, irrespective of their democratic pedigree or lack 
of it, or willingness to address poverty in their jurisdiction. 
 
Now, in this network with its outcomes, it is unclear which individual actions are the violating or 
wronging actions, equivalent to enslaving, that the system collectively empowers and with which 
we are complicit. Individual economic decisions only have the consequence of causing poverty 
given a myriad of other decisions, including the decisions of persons to work the presses producing 
money, run the computers allowing trading, the post offices shipping goods; to trade in goods, in 
wholesale and then in retail, large and tiny, selling goods which the poor need at market prices 
beyond their reach. These actions only add up to poverty as the consequence of a system of 
interlocking effects where forces, like that of supply and demand and currency production, lead to 
negative outcomes for the poor. No one of these actions is obviously the culpable action, the wrong, 
needed for the account of complicity to go through. Take the farmer that receives subsidies to assist 
her farming business. Her action is neither designed to starve poor farmers nor would it have that 
effect were it not for an economic system in which the laws of supply and demand are allowed to 
operate. The actions of the government that offers the subsidies are designed to uphold a sector of 
its economy (I am assuming that states have legitimate domestic imperatives to advance economic 
growth). The negative consequences of the subsidy only take effect if other agents step in to buy the 
farmer's products on the word market, and sell these in retail outlets. Without someone making a 
choice to buy the cheaper product, at every level, including the lowliest consumer, poor as she 
might be, benefitting from cheaper goods, there would be no negative outcome: the product would 
not be sold in preference to products of less well off or less protected producers. In order to blame 
any of these agents we would need to refer to an action-guiding perfect duty-imposing principle 
each could follow in making market choices that by being followed establishes a reasonable balance 
between their individual market aims and securing a given level for global wellbeing. Without such 
a principle we have no sense of actions that diverge from the principle thereby constituting directed 
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wrongs. 
 
Contrast with this the failure of a domestic government to make provisions for poverty or to tax the 
affluent in their society at a sufficient rate to alleviate grave poverty. These actions are wrongs 
because that type of agent has no legitimate aims or commitments that outweigh acting fairly with 
regard to domestic distribution. It is precisely charged with the fairness and wellbeing of citizens 
over whom it has authoritative powers to assign distribution-affecting rights and duties. That agent 
is capable of making redistributive policy choices for citizens that treat them fairly, or not. Whether 
it is Mugabe starving a section of the countryside, or a regime allowing starvation without engaging 
tax measures to address it, governmental actions that should address accumulated effects but fail to 
do so, are unjust, and where they cause serious harm, deeply unjust.15 Our actions as market agents, 
on the other hand, do have legitimate aims. As I have said, without a principle for reasonably 
balancing these aims with personally advancing global wellbeing, there is no clear obligation to 
violate. With no clear obligation, the charge that these aims wrong the poor does not stick. 
 
But note this is not an argument from “messiness”. It does not say that because the situation is so 
causally messy, one cannot know who is indeed responsible and how much responsibility they bear 
exactly. This is a principled argument rejecting the idea that being knowingly involved in a network 
of causes that has a foreseeable negative outcome is sufficient to make one morally responsible for 
violations.16 The analogies offered by Minimal Cosmopolitans all identify clear wronging actions, 
where the individual actions clearly impose unreasonable costs on others. Members of the Nazi 
party contributing to the final solution, states permitting domestic violence, slavery, enforced 
starvation, and the like, are all examples where there are clear unreasonable impositions of loss by 
each agent involved. There are also negligence cases, such as two agents polluting a river upstream 
of a village.17 Even if it takes two polluters to produce harmful levels of pollutant, each polluter has 
clearly imposed a recognisably unreasonable increased risk of poisoning. There is no equivalent 
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action among legitimate market aims such as buying and selling itself identifiably and unreasonably 
increasing risks to others. Perhaps the whole system increases risks, but no individual agent can be 
said to be unreasonable risk-increasers. This is true even for actions contributing to the system 
because the contribution is not an unreasonable risk-increaser. As I have said, that would require a 
principle for individual actions that when followed reasonably balances legitimate personal aims 
and global wellbeing aims. Without such a principle to violate there is no sense of wrongful 
imposition of risk. 
 
Is ‘the wronging action’ not, then, the sum total of those actions that contribute to the negative 
effects? Those actions are not part of a project, with shared aims, to produce poverty as an outcome. 
Nor do they comprise a collective negligent action of imposing poverty, as a shared aim would still 
be needed to identify the collective negligence. Even incompetent members of the Nazi party were 
morally complicit with its violations because they acted in ways that shared its aims and sought to 
contribute to them. That is certainly not the case with the actions of market agents domestically or 
internationally. There is no communicable shared aim related to imposing poverty 
 
(B) So in what, non-metaphorical sense, can we as individuals be said to be “cooperating in 
imposing unjust social institutions upon” the poor?18 This brings us to the crux of the Minimal 
Cosmopolitan case. This identifies the wronging action as those decisions or agreements in 
international forums that ‘impose poverty’ on the global poor by shaping the international economic 
system in the wrong way. Agreements at trade fora such as the WTO for example, favour wealthy 
countries, and contribute to seriously negative effects in terms of poverty. Citizens of states 
involved in making those agreements that lend their support by voting for them, or paying them 
taxes, are liable for the imposed losses to the global poor. 
 
It is certainly true that the institutions of a state that make decisions impacting gravely on citizens 
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thereby wrong those citizens. A state that imposes an unfair increase in the risk of traffic fatalities, 
domestic violence, enslavement, discrimination, and starvation on it citizens is an unjust order.19 At 
least, it is unjust if there is no good reason to allow such an increase. No state can remove all 
negative risks, and sometimes some negative risks (traffic fatalities) need to be balanced against 
gains (to the economy, and the social benefits of transport). However, a state that colludes with 
harmful actions, permitting violence and discrimination, say, or permits increased risks for no 
reasonable balancing motivation, thereby wrongs its citizens. Allowing its citizens to starve, when it 
could take distributive measures, is such a wrong. Whilst direct responsibility for institutional 
harms here lies with those in power, upholding their power does imply a degree of complicity with 
those institutional harms. Citizens knowingly voting for a brutal or negligent regime do not carry 
out the human rights violations themselves, yet they are guilty of complicity with the regime’s 
actions. Their votes either directly or negligently empower a regime to carry out violations. 
 
International economic institutions, however, do not have this character. They are at best fora for 
agreements between states on what obstacles or removal of obstacles they will undertake with 
regard to trade across their borders. Each tariff or tariff removal represents a gain or a loss in term 
of growth for an economy, and must be considered in the context of all potential gains or losses. 
This is negotiated in context of a competitive market, making for competitive negotiations. Each 
state develops a negotiating mandate in line with domestic imperatives to advance growth.20 If we 
accept that domestic imperatives towards economic growth, employment, and other domestic 
commitments are to some extent legitimate, what reasonable balance between these and global aims 
can a state follow in its international agreements? There is no one authoritative body with powers to 
distribute rights and duties over trade, access to other goods and burdens of importance to growth, 
development and individual wellbeing globally. Which is to say no single agent exists that can 
pursue a continuous plan for fair distribution of economic development and wellbeing. So there is 
no fair scheme to which any agent can contribute a fair burden. This means that, just as with 
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individual market agents, there is no clear principle each state can adopt in its choices and 
agreements that gives reasonable weight both to domestic imperatives and levels of global 
wellbeing. In which case there is no clear sense in which state decisions in agreements of this kind 
impose a wellbeing deficit. That is an effect of a system that accepts markets aims, and state’s 
domestic economic obligations as presuppositions. There are, as I have said, clear examples of 
wrongful action in this context: theft, subterfuge, fraud, murder, inhuman working conditions, 
corruption, selling arms to those who will use them for repression, and the like. These are clearly 
identifiable actions, violating principles of reasonable loss/risk or complicity. Signing up to 
agreements licencing those types of action would be a wrong for that reason. But agreements on 
trade do not have the systematic aim of licencing such acts. 
 
A perfect duty of care, as I have said, does fall on bodies with powers to continuously adjust 
background conditions by allocating rights and duties to the degree that they can do so. For these 
agents principles to fairly distribute costs for the accumulated effects of individual choices make 
sense. No international body has that kind of global adjusting power. 
 
(C) One other way that the global order might be said to wrong the poor is by the imposition of the 
current version of the states system itself. Take the recognised rights of governments, irrespective 
of democratic pedigree, to sell natural resources and to obtain international loans. These, given 
corruptions and misgovernment, have negative effects in the form of impoverished populations. Do 
we empower our governments to give that right to other states, or to fail to remove that right, and so 
wrong people’s whose poverty is a result? The answer is clearly no. The international legal system 
is defined by key background principles. The central and defining animus behind these is the 
background principle that cedes to states the ultimate power to create new duties and allocate rights 
to citizens.21 That power is not limitless, but only states have even the limited version except in 
circumstances that threaten international public order, peace and security. The principle of mutual 
 17 
recognition of states as units of political authority, and the system of cooperation that is built on it, 
implies obligations on all states in the international order to observe rules of respect in dealing with 
each other. Save for international public order reasons, no state can be forced, in that system, to 
adopt any particular internal policies. International public order, peace and security, are aims 
defining international crime and legitimate intervention.22 These principles are established by 
international custom, sometimes codified in treaties, but not revocable by any body or assembly. In 
fact the establishment of any new international obligations or schemes presupposes those principles. 
To change those principles, then, would require more than any one government changing its foreign 
policy, it would require a complete reconfiguration of the international system, representing more 
than a particular trade or aid decision but actually a challenge to the existing standards guaranteeing 
equality and legitimacy of independent states. It could also potentially have worse outcomes with 
regard to access for aid and development, and provoking conflict. 
 
Whether or not that is desirable or feasible, it is certainly not within the reach of any individual 
government agency at any one time at any reasonable cost. Nor is it within the power of any 
agency, at any one time, to prevent that change taking place, simply because it is not a change that 
is responsive to individual agent decisions. Changing these fundamental presuppositions of the 
system of international law would take negotiation, consensus, agreement, prevention of instability, 
calming residual violence, readjustment in case of adverse effects, and much, much more. After all, 
this means states must, at the level of general principle, relinquish their rights to govern themselves 
by their own standards of legitimacy. Without a management board, in other words an arrogation of 
state powers by a given body, the consequences of such changes will not be manageable. States 
threatened with scrutiny may disallow even aid to reach those who need it, and alliances of 
opportunity will all too easily lead to violent reprisals. Even with some degree of willing 
cooperation with the aims, such as ending government corruption and using domestic natural 
resources for development, implementation may still need external management all the way down. 
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The above story is not supposed to show that a different system is impossible. It rather asks which 
action (individual or collective) in these circumstances we should take to be the wronging or 
violating action we are assisting? Or put it another way, what is the principle imposing reasonable 
burdens as perfect duties, and falling on which agents, that is being breached in regard to this 
prospective world order? I am assuming here that the wrong against the global poor with which 
Minimal Cosmopolitans take us to be complicit is not based on a description of an imposing set of 
conditionals, viz.: if our government were to adopt a given policy, and if other governments chose 
to join that policy, and if enough governments could be got behind the policy, and if there was an 
international convention, and if the current status of states in the international system was given up, 
and if enough governments did this to change that system decisively and states eventually 
integrated into an economic governance regime, and…so on, then the global poor would be better 
off. That kind of ‘speculative’ responsibility depends on links in the chain for which we have no 
idea of their respective prospect of success, and certainly there is no clear set of instructions we 
could devise which would successfully guide any agent through all the conditions, at a reasonable 
burden and guaranteeing the result. Would we permit some war and instability to consolidate global 
governance? Do we prioritise today’s poor in our decisions, or the prospective poor at the end of the 
chain of conditionals? Those questions are sufficiently troubling to make it absurd to ascribe human 
rights violations on the (logical) possibility of an alternative order. 
 
The deceptively simple claim that there is a less harmful alternative to the global economic order 
hides deep complications. To convert an aim into a standard of justice by which we might be judged 
we would need clear instructions with appropriate obligations that if acted on would produce that 
world. And the cost to any agent of following the instruction would have to be a reasonable one. 
Our failure to act would then be equivalent to a choice to unreasonably allow this world to be 
imposed on the poor. But there is no such instruction or action that connects with more than a 
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merely speculative sense of our ‘failure to reform’.23 People cannot be complicit in human rights 
violations if they “fail” to reform the system when they have no idea what reasonable course of 
action will ultimately make a difference in producing that aim. 
 
In sum, we still do not have a suitable candidate for an action constituting a directed wrong, a 
violation, with which we might be complicit. Now of course, the role of human rights their 
connection with the condition of directed wronging action I have proposed might be rejected in 
favour of the view without the condition. But, if all that motivates the rejection is a desire to 
describe global poverty as a human rights breach and to hold ourselves individually morally 
responsible for the breach, then the move would be ad hoc rather than principled. It is also less 
compelling to people to hold them accountable for a violation when it is unclear what choices 
would genuinely constitute a non-violation. Appealing to remedy as a way to avoid the taint of 
violation gets things the wrong way round: you need to identify a violating action before you can 
figure out how suitable any remedy might be. 
 
IV 
6. International Cosmopolitanism 
None of this is a plea for the status quo. It is not a critique that says that no moral standards apply 
internationally, or even the view that says that only standards prohibiting directed wrongs, apply in 
that sphere. The alternative I propose can be called International Cosmopolitanism. That view 
accepts not only the existence of states, but also that whilst we have a states system, what principles 
apply must fit with values of cooperation appropriate to the states system. 
 
This means framing principles for enlightened states to seek international cooperation, including 
economic cooperation. Those principles will include obligations to respect other states, not only 
formally in terms of status, but also through fair terms of association, trade, and mutual assistance. 
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This goes hand in hand with obligations of internal justice owed by states to their citizens: their 
social duty of care, as well as the responsibilities of states not to engage in directed wrongs against 
any person. It also goes hand in hand with principles obliging states to hold their own citizens 
responsible for crimes committed abroad (principles of extra-territorial criminal responsibility). 
And in those instances where a state is incapable of carrying out its social duty of care, there are 
obligations of assistance, requiring states to aid other states in arriving at a position where they can 
engage in social distributive justice. Furthermore, where a state refuses to carry out its social duty 
of care to the point of severely harming its citizens, other states have duties to assist those persons 
where they can. Ultimately, the duty to assist must involve cooperation in setting up agreements 
that rationalise this assistance activity, at least more than they are currently ‘rationalised’. But all 
these obligations cannot be perfect duties as they require balancing with domestic obligations of 
justice.24 
 
International Cosmopolitanism also requires that states uphold the system that makes international 
cooperation possible, by upholding international public order and peace. That includes working to 
prosecute international crimes and prevent destabilising catastrophes, through cooperation and 
agreement to avoid currency wars, trade wars and massive price fluctuations. Consider the positive 
measure, achievable by agreement, of setting up of a global reserve currency to deal with balance of 
payments deficits and lend to states, including developing countries, in an equitable way.25 
 
Most of the institutional requirements, those which require cooperation, in the above list can only 
be imperfect obligations, leaving a degree of (but not absolute) discretion and balancing with 
domestic obligations of justice to states in their associational agreements. Other obligations, such as 
human rights-based duties proper, duties to prosecute extra-territorial crimes, and fulfil domestic 
social justice, only make sense if they are understood as perfect duties. 
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This brief description of obligations in a cooperative states system implies requirements reaching 
considerably beyond the status quo. The global economic system does indeed have severe and 
harmful effects, however it distorts both the distinctive role of human rights standards, and our 
understanding of those negative effects if we impose that terminology on them. Nor is International 
Cosmopolitanism a non-ideal theory, designed for a world where compliance with ideal theory 
would be difficult. It is, instead, ideal theory designed for a world where the units of political 
authority (empowered to continually allocate social rights and duties) are states and in which a 
background set of principles (of international law) exists defining cooperation, peace and public 
order between these units. Against that background designing fair institutions of cooperation is a 
valuable ideal and an onerous task given the propensity of states to replace domestic self-interest for 
fair terms and honest dealing with other states. Such a conclusion may not be as heroic as the 
conclusion that we are all human rights violators or complicit with human rights violators, but it is 
more appropriate as an analysis for engaging with the one clear subject of international justice, 
which is the foreign policy of political states. 
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